Author(s)' contact information
Publication
Journal of Legal Education
Volume number
37
Year
1987
First page number
495
Country
United States
Abstract
Do we teach virtue? Can we teach it? Must we teach it? How do we teach it? Asking these questions from the perspective of law and philosophy, in which I have trained and taught, I realize that they are not new questions, but rather are a perennial problem of education. The question, "Can virtue be taught?" has presented a problem for Western education since its inception in Socrates, who wandered the streets of Athens, asking his troublesome questions and pushing them without stint to his death. Here I pursue a more modest goal. Of course I mean to recall Plato's presentation in the Protagoras of Socrates' inquiry into the nature of virtue and its teachability. But, as my title suggests, I am displacing the traditional Socratic-Platonic question somewhat: I am claiming that the issue of the teachability of virtue is misrepresented by our traditional understanding of Plato's and Socrates' inquiry. In its place, I am suggesting not only that virtue can be taught, and that it is taught, but that it must be taught. It must be taught by us, to our children and students, for better or worse. How I come to this conclusion, and what it means, are at the heart of this article.